De-Alerting Nuclear Forces
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Authors
Miller, Tim
Davis, Rebecca
Issue Date
2009
Type
Other
Language
en_US
Keywords
Alternative Title
Abstract
De-alerting the posture of the United States nuclear arsenal is a concept that has been examined at length by military and non-governmental communities since the 1990s. The issue of de-alerting hinges on whether the United States – Russian relationship warrants a change to promptly configured nuclear forces. Proponents of de-alerting presume that Russian intentions toward the United States today are benign; opponents believe Russia’s capabilities and actions do not warrant de-alerting. This paper assesses the implications and challenges surrounding the de-alerting of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and suggests that the fundamental relationship between the United States and Russia should drive the alert postures of both countries.
Description
INSS Strategic Paper
Citation
Inst For National Security Studies Us Air Force Academy Co, Tim Miller, and Rebecca Davis. 2009. “De-Alerting Nuclear Forces.” DTIC, January. https://research-ebsco-com.usafa.idm.oclc.org/linkprocessor/plink?id=454e5460-3c73-3046-b74f-bb2366f941e9.
Publisher
DTIC