The Trilateral Force: The Atlantic Alliance and the Future of Nuclear Weapons Strategy
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Authors
Zielinski, John P.
Issue Date
2013-12
Type
Other
Language
en_US
Keywords
Alternative Title
Abstract
The United States seems trapped in the policy paradox of desiring continued nuclear arms reductions while recognizing the current reality of needing to maintain a robust nuclear arms deterrent. How far can the United States decrease its nuclear weapons stockpile and still maintain the required effective deterrent? How many nuclear weapons are enough? In the future, only through nuclear coalition operations can the United States continue to meet its national security commitments at minimum deterrence levels. A proposed Trilateral Force is a viable means of maintaining a Nuclear Triad capable of meeting extended deterrence security commitments, while preserving strategic stability at the lowest possible nuclear arsenal levels, at the least cost and greatest efficiency. A Trilateral Force structure bridges seemingly opposing requirements of national security. It allows the United States to incrementally and continually reduce its nuclear arsenal in pursuit of arms reduction goals, preserving operational capability and strategic stability among the world s nuclear powers, while maintaining a credible minimal deterrence posture. By linking an increase in nuclear coalition operations to a decrease in nuclear arsenals, the United States can bridge the gap between the desire for global zero and the need to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent.
Description
Electronic Resource
Citation
ir Force Academy Colorado Springs Co, and John P Zielinski. 2013. “The Trilateral Force: The Atlantic Alliance and the Future of Nuclear Weapons Strategy.” DTIC, January. https://research-ebsco-com.usafa.idm.oclc.org/linkprocessor/plink?id=17ba2b3d-f2b6-35bb-b638-570921155085.
Publisher
DTIC